PREM Rugby’s financial struggles: A decade of unsustainability

Premiership Rugby (recently rebranded as PREM Rugby) has long operated under a financially volatile business model. Recent reports—most notably the Leonard Curtis Rugby Finance Reports for the 2022/23 and 2023/24 seasons—have highlighted the depth and persistence of these problems.

Over the past five seasons, not a single club in the league reported a profit for 2022/23, and losses continued into 2023/24, with combined deficits of approximately £34 million ($45.89 million). In the 2023/24 season alone, six out of 10 clubs recorded losses of at least £3 million ($4.04 million) each.

Player wage costs remain one of the biggest threats to both club viability and competitive integrity. Many clubs have historically allocated 80–90% of their revenue to salaries, leaving little buffer when income falls or when debt servicing and other operational costs rise.

Although the salary cap is set at £6.4 million ($8.64 million) for 2024/25, the league is taking steps to improve stability following recent insolvencies. From 2026/27, a £5.4 million ($7.29 million) salary floor will be introduced, aimed at encouraging sustainable investment and reducing the risk of destabilizing cycles of excessive spending.

Despite modest revenue growth, PREM Rugby’s underlying balance sheet position remains fragile. Total debt has reached a reported £342.5 million ($462.89 million) by 2026. While Northampton Saints and Leicester Tigers remain financially stable, six of the 10 clubs are considered technically insolvent.

Bristol Bears, in particular, have seen their debt surpass £67 million ($90.55 million), leaving the club dependent on ongoing owner support. Overall, the league is heavily reliant on private investment to cover recurring annual losses and substantial loan obligations.

Investment since COVID-19: Not just money on the field

Since August 2025, investor groups have begun to make significant inroads into PREM Rugby. This includes Red Bull’s acquisition of the Newcastle Falcons and Sir James Dyson’s purchase of a 50% stake in Bath Rugby, worth tens of millions of pounds.

Red Bull assumed full ownership of Newcastle Falcons, taking on approximately £39 million ($52.68 million) in debt, including £14.5 million ($19.58 million) in unpaid COVID-related government loans. The club has been rebranded as the Newcastle Red Bulls, with ambitious plans for academy investment, improved fan engagement, and renewed infrastructure.

The goal is to transform the club into a competitive, sustainable, and commercially viable entity under a 10-year plan for domestic and European success. These developments demonstrate both strong investor interest and a strategic approach to building not just teams, but club brands.

In Bath’s case, James Dyson’s 50% stake includes control or shared control of the stadium infrastructure (Arena 1865). Although less dramatic than a full takeover, this investment indicates a new direction for the reigning PREM Rugby champions by strengthening the club’s physical and commercial foundation.

The long-term importance of this financial backing goes beyond merely improving the playing and coaching setup. It notably reduces risk (like owner withdrawal or rising debt) and enables clubs to enhance sponsor opportunities, expand brand licensing, and even increase international exposure. These are all necessary steps to close the widening gap between rising costs and revenue generation.

The Exeter Chiefs turnover: Bill Foley and Bournemouth owners step in

The most significant recent ownership development in PREM Rugby is the proposed takeover of the Exeter Chiefs by Bill Foley, through his multi-club platform Black Knight Sports & Entertainment (BKSE). Foley’s group already owns AFC Bournemouth and the Vegas Golden Knights, with a sports footprint spanning multiple clubs and markets in Europe and beyond. BKSE’s investor group even includes Michael B. Jordan as a minority partner.

For Exeter, this deal would mark a pivotal shift—from a consistently high-performing club under Tony Rowe’s chairmanship to one operated under a model geared towards infrastructure development and commercial growth. Rowe has candidly acknowledged that the club’s progress has relied heavily on his personal financial support, including covering more than £10 million ($13.52 million) in recent post-tax losses.

But given Exeter Rugby’s 150+ years of history and identity rooted in the local community, any change in ownership is inherently sensitive. There are concerns around preserving tradition, member accountability, and governance transparency.

Ultimately, the decision rests with the club’s 700 members, who are scheduled to vote on the transaction at an extraordinary general meeting on May 7, where a 75% majority is needed to ratify the sale. If approved, BKSE would bring Exeter an elite operational blueprint focused less on headline spending and more on disciplined execution.

At AFC Bournemouth, the group has proven its ability to outperform budget expectations despite infrastructure constraints—an important capability for a club at Exeter’s scale.

The benefits of a multi-club system include the use of sophisticated analytics and smarter recruitment across a wider network. Professionalizing these areas could help Exeter push beyond traditional local limits, expand its commercial reach, deepen fan engagement, and build a more global brand. The ideal outcome would allow Exeter to preserve its community roots while adopting an advanced, modern operational platform—a “best of both worlds” approach to sustainable success.

Structural reform: The end of automatic promotion & relegation from 2026-27

Following the RFU’s decision to abolish automatic promotion and relegation between PREM Rugby and the Championship starting with the 2026/27 season, the league will move to a criteria-based licensing model. Under this system, clubs must demonstrate financial resilience, robust governance, suitable facilities, and credible commercial plans to enter or remain in the top division.

This reform could be transformative, particularly for attracting new investors. The historical “relegation nightmare”—a major deterrent to long-term capital—will be eliminated. Greater membership security will make it easier to forecast and underwrite key revenue streams, such as media distributions, sponsorship, matchday income, and wider fan engagement.

This increased predictability should help stabilize and potentially increase club valuations. It also encourages long-term capital investment in stadiums, academies, and operations since a single poor season is less likely to lead to a sudden financial crisis.

Conclusion

Despite a decade of losses, unsustainably high wage-to-revenue ratios, and rising debt that have left several clubs in precarious positions, PREM Rugby may now be entering a more investable phase. New financial backing at Newcastle and Bath, as well as the proposed American investor takeover of Exeter, suggests that capital is available for long-term projects focused on brand expansion, facilities, and professionalized operations, rather than short-term spending on players.

Eliminating automatic relegation should further improve revenue stability, reduce risk, and strengthen club valuations. The critical next step is to ensure that this influx of investment is matched by disciplined cost controls, sustainable wage structures, and governance that prevents a return to the boom-and-bust cycles of the past.